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Common wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is irrelevant for 
actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental research, however, has shown that 
the introduction of a minimum wage can raise even those wages that were already above the 
new minimum wage. In this paper, we analyze how these findings can be explained by 
theoretical wage bargaining models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining 
solution is unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such 
minimum wages can drive up wages – and be harmful to employment – when bargaining 
follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 
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1.  Introduction 
The wage and employment effects of a statutory minimum wage are a fiercely debated 
topic among economists and policymakers. Its proponents argue that raising the wages of the 
lowest-paid would help fighting poverty, while its critics claim that introducing such rigidities 
impedes the allocative role of flexible wages, causing more unemployment and possibly even 
more poverty. Theoretical labor economics cannot provide a clear-cut answer on which view 
is correct, since the effects of minimum wages depend strongly on the structure of the labor 
market. While minimum wages are generally expected to be harmful to employment when 
labor markets are competitive, there is the possibility that introducing  a wage floor can 
actually increase employment if the labor market is characterized by monopsonistic structures 
and minimum wages are not set at too high levels (see Brown (1999)  for an overview). 
Empirical studies do not give a clear picture either. While some case studies, focusing at 
specific industries at the regional level, provide evidence for positive employment effects 
(Card and Krueger 1995), studies that focus on broader groups typically find negative 
employment effects (Neumark and Wascher 2008).  
Despite these controversial views, there appears to be one issue that receives support from 
proponents and opponents of the minimum wage alike: minimum wages have to be binding to 
have any effect on wages and employment.  According to this commonly held belief, a 
minimum wage set at a non-binding level, i.e. below what the lowest-paid workers in an 
economy would receive even without it, cannot be effective in raising actually paid wages and 
thus will not have any impact on employment. In short: a minimum wage is either binding or 
de facto non-existent. 
This conventional view, however, is at odds with a number of observations obtained from 
empirical and experimental studies of minimum wages. A large number of empirical studies 
report that introducing or raising the minimum wage has spillover effects to wages higher up 
in the wage distribution (see Card and Krueger (1995, Ch. 5) and Neumark and Wascher 
(2008, Ch. 4) for an overview). Three possible explanations for the existence of spillover 
effects are provided by the theoretical literature: 1)  firms try to replace minimum wage 
workers with close substitutes higher up in the wage distribution, thereby pushing up their 
wages, 2) high-wage firms find it harder to recruit employees from low-wage firms and thus 
have to pay higher wages, and 3) firms adjust wages to maintain the differential between their Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
- 2 - 
 
lowest-skilled and higher-skilled workers in order to preserve incentives for effort and skill 
acquisition. Laboratory experiments, however, in which such effects can be eliminated by 
design, suggest that these three reasons cannot exhaustively explain why spillover effects 
occur.  Falk et al. (2006)  report on an experiment in which a rent is distributed  between 
participants acting as “workers” and a “firm”. Even though demand shifts and wage hierarchy 
considerations cannot play a role in this setting, the experiment shows that introducing a 
minimum wage still affects the equilibrium wage structure by raising workers’ reservation 
wages. Falk et al. (2006) argue that the minimum wage affects what people consider to be a 
”fair” compensation for their work. If increasing the minimum wage also raises the wage 
demanded by workers paid above the minimum level, even a non-binding minimum wage 
could have real labor market effects. Fairness concerns might thus also play an important role 
in explaining the existence of spillover effects. Brandts and Charness (2004) show that the 
introduction of a minimum wage, even if it is non-binding, affects workers’ effort provision 
negatively. In their interpretation, wage determination is driven by gift-exchange 
considerations (Akerlof 1982). Workers perceive a given wage to be less kind if the difference 
to the wage the firm would have to pay anyway shrinks, which leads them to exert less effort. 
Under a more general perspective, these findings suggest that preferences over wages are 
menu dependent (Sen 1997). All potentially available, but eventually foregone, choices matter 
for the determination of wages because workers value their wage in relation to the firm’s 
options. 
In this paper, we will analyze how  menu dependence can  explain spillover effects in 
theoretical models of wage bargaining. In particular, we will examine whether a non-binding 
minimum wage can affect wages and employment if wage bargaining between firms and 
unions can be described by the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions (Nash 
1950, Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975).  For the Nash solution, the “common wisdom” is 
supported. The introduction of a non-binding minimum wage cannot change the outcome of a 
Nash bargain because it does not affect any of the relevant parameters of the bargaining 
solution. A non-binding minimum wage, i.e. a minimum wage that is less than the lowest 
wage received by any worker in the economy, is irrelevant for the bargaining set and the 
bargaining parties’ outside options. Only if the minimum wage is binding for at least some 
workers, it could potentially have spillover effects to other workers by changing the value of 
their outside option. The fairness concerns that appear to drive the empirical and experimental 
findings cited above do not play a role in the Nash bargaining solution. Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) proposed an alternative bargaining solution (henceforth 
KS solution) that is often considered to incorporate fairness considerations into the wage 
bargain (McDonald and Solow 1981). The KS solution states that both bargaining parties 
agree to a solution that equalizes the relative utility gains, defined as the ratio of the actual 
gain to the maximum feasible gain. Each party’s maximum feasible gain is determined by the 
payoff it can secure by pushing the other party to the minimum payoff it would just be willing 
(or allowed) to accept. A reduction in a party’s maximum feasible gain will then also diminish 
its “just” claim to the bargaining set. Contrary to the Nash solution, a non-binding minimum 
wage can affect the bargaining solution in the KS solution because it reduces the  firm’s 
maximum feasible gain. Without a statutory minimum wage, a firm’s maximum feasible gain 
is given by its profit if it paid its workers exactly the value of their outside option. A union’s 
maximum feasible gain in this case would be determined by the highest wage the firm would 
be willing to pay without closing down or relocating (or the monopoly union solution if this is 
associated with a lower wage). The KS bargaining outcome requires equal sacrifices of both 
parties, so that the union will not be able to set its most desired wage, but it will definitively 
reach a payoff higher than its outside option. If a minimum wage is introduced at a level 
between the bargained wage and the union’s outside option, it will not be binding, i.e. no 
worker will have received a wage at or below the new minimum level prior to its introduction. 
Nevertheless, such a non-binding minimum wage will affect the bargaining outcome because 
it reduces the firm’s maximum feasible gain. Prior to the introduction of the minimum wage, 
the best a firm could achieve was to reduce the union’s payoff to its outside option. With a 
wage floor above the former outside option, however, the firm can at best reduce the wage to 
its statutory minimum. This results in a smaller maximum feasible gain of the firm, which 
reduces its claim to the bargaining set and leads to higher wages and lower employment. 
Hence, the KS bargaining solution can provide a theoretical justification for the empirical 
observation that even a non-binding minimum wage, set at a level below the wages actually 
observed in the labor market, can lead to rising wage levels and reduced employment. 
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on spillover 
effects of minimum wages. Section 3 derives the labor market outcome when bargaining 
follows either the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Section 4 discusses  the labor 
market effects of a minimum wage introduction. Section 5 concludes. Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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2.  Spillover effects: Theory and evidence 
The obvious effect of the introduction of a minimum wage is that it raises the wages of 
workers that were previously paid less than the new minimum (given that they keep their 
jobs). A less obvious, but nevertheless regularly observed effect of the introduction of, or an 
increase in, the minimum wage is that it raises the wages of some workers even above the 
new minimum. Similarly, the wages of some workers who were already paid above the new 
minimum increase even further. This positive impact of a legal minimum wage on wages 
higher up in the wage distribution has become known as “spillover” or “ripple” effects. 
Economic theory provides three popular explanations for the existence of spillover effects. 
The first explanation builds on shifts in labor demand induced by the minimum wage. If 
workers have different productivities because they differ in their levels of human capital, the 
introduction of a minimum wage will cause firms to substitute away from workers with 
productivity below the new minimum wage towards workers with higher productivities. This 
will increase the return to human capital and thus results in higher wages for workers who 
were already better-paid. Pettengill (1981)  develops a model in which the degree of 
substitutability between different skill groups is greater between workers whose skill levels 
are relatively close than between workers whose skill levels differ substantially. In this model, 
spillover effects will be strongest for workers who earn wages above, but close to the new 
minimum wage, while workers farther up the wage distribution do not benefit.  
A second explanation can be derived in equilibrium search models with monopsonistic 
firm behavior. Manning (2003)  shows that, in a modified Burdett-Mortensen  (1998) 
framework, firms that previously paid relatively high wages to attract workers from low-wage 
firms can only recruit enough new employees if they increase their wages too. This effect is 
strongest for firms that used to pay wages just above the new minimum, so that spillovers will 
be concentrated to wage level close to the minimum wage.  
A third explanation is provided by efficiency wage models. Grossman (1983) develops a 
model with skilled and unskilled labor in which the effort exerted by skilled workers depends 
on their wage relative to that received by unskilled workers. If an increase in the legal 
minimum wage raises the wages of unskilled workers, then there will be a demand shift effect 
(as described above) that increases the demand and the wages of skilled workers. In addition, 
the smaller wage differential between skilled and unskilled work will reduce skilled workers’ 
effort, so that the firm will have to increase the wage received by higher-paid workers as well. Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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In this type of model, firms react to an increase in the minimum wage by maintaining their 
internal wage hierarchy. 
A number of empirical studies have examined the existence and magnitude of the 
spillover effect from minimum wages.
1
To estimate the magnitude of spillover effects, Manning (2003) assumes that, without the 
minimum wage, wages would follow a standard log normal distribution and then compares 
the actual with an estimated latent wage distribution, using data for the U.S. between 1979 
and 2000. His findings suggest that spillovers amount to about 11 percent of the minimum 
wage for wages just above the new minimum, but disappear for wages higher than 50 percent 
above the minimum wage. In a related study for Great Britain, Dickens and Manning (2004) 
find only small spillover effects in the short run, and virtually no spillovers if a longer time 
horizon is considered. 
 The first such study was conducted by Grossman 
(1983). Her results indicate that an increase in the minimum wage increases the wages of 
occupations just above the new minimum wage, at least in the short run. In the long-run, the 
effects are less clear, perhaps because the real value of the minimum wage diminished due to 
inflation. Katz and Krueger (1992) study the effect of the increase in the federal minimum 
wage from $3.35 to $3.80 in 1990 and to $4.25 in 1991 on fast-food restaurants in Texas. 
They find that about one-third of surveyed Texan fast-food restaurants reacted to the 1991 
minimum wage increase by “maintaining their wage hierarchy”. The wages of workers who 
earned more than the old minimum wage would be raised as well, so that they would also 
exceed the new minimum wage. Among firms in which the starting wage was already above 
the new minimum wage, 60 percent reacted to the higher minimum wage by raising their 
wages even further. In a similar study for the 1992 minimum wage increase in New Jersey, 
Card and Krueger (1994) do not observe evidence for spillover effects. 
A more direct approach to estimating spillover effects is taken by Neumark et al. (2004), 
who estimate the impact of changes in the minimum wage on the wages of workers already 
earning more than the new minimum. To control for contemporaneous general wage growth, 
they compared workers in states in which the minimum wage was raised to workers at the 
same position in the wage distribution in states in which the minimum wage stayed constant. 
The results are indicative of substantial short-run spillovers to higher wage groups. For 
                                                 
1 An overview over these studies is provided by Card and Krueger (1995, Ch. 5) and Neumark and Wascher 
(2008, Ch. 4). Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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workers with wages close to the new minimum wage (less than 10 percent more than the 
minimum), the wage elasticity with respect to the minimum wage is 0.8. This elasticity is 
smaller for higher wage groups, but is still amounts to 0.15 for workers who earn between 1.5 
and two times the minimum wage. In the long run, the effects seem to be weaker than in the 
short run, and might even be negative for higher wage groups. This suggests that wage growth 
in states in which the minimum wage was raised was weaker than in the control states in the 
years following the increase in the minimum wage. Apparently, employers were able to 
reclaim some of the wage increases they had to give to their employees after the minimum 
wage increase by suspending the nominal wage increases they would have paid otherwise. 
While  employers’ attempts to maintain their internal wage hierarchy,  to ensure 
competitive wages compared to other firms, or to preserve incentives for effort might provide 
an explanation for spillover effects, such influences can be excluded in experimental studies. 
Falk et al. (2006)  conduct a laboratory experiment indicating that behavioral aspects, in 
particular menu dependence, play an important role in explaining the effects of minimum 
wages across the wage distribution. In their experiment,  a rent is distributed between 
participants acting as “workers” and a “firm”. In the experiment’s first step, workers state 
their reservation wages, which are not observed by the firm. Then, the firm makes a wage 
offer, workers with reservation wages below this wage offer are hired by the firm, and the 
resulting rent is shared between the parties. Falk et al. (2006) show that the introduction of a 
minimum wage affects the labor market equilibrium by raising workers’ reservation wages. 
Before the minimum wage was introduced, about 91 percent of workers stated a reservation 
wage below the later minimum. After its introduction, 59 percent of the workers reported that 
their reservation wage was equal to the new minimum wage, and the other 41 percent said that 
their reservation wage was even larger than the new minimum. 
The results by Falk et al. (2006) suggest that the minimum wage acts as an anchor which 
workers use to judge the fairness of the actual wage paid. From a bargaining perspective, the 
fact that the equilibrium wage is increased above the new minimum indicates that reductions 
in the set of available alternatives can affect bargaining outcomes, even if the alternatives that 
become unavailable were not chosen initially. In case of the introduction of the minimum 
wage, such a legal minimum makes a range of low wages unattainable for the firm. While 
workers may have judged a wage payment fair, or even generous, if there was no minimum 
wage, the introduction of a minimum wage close to the same wage might cause workers to 
perceive this wage as unfair and to demand higher wages. Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
- 7 - 
 
This short review of the theoretical and empirical literature has illustrated that minimum 
wages do more than simply cut off the lowest part of the wage distribution. Instead, two 
important stylized facts can be observed: 
1. a substantial number of firms raise the wages of workers that used to earn less than the 
new minimum wage above the minimum level required, and  
2. it seems to be common practice that workers already earning wages above the new 
minimum wage receive wage raises as well. 
In the rest of this paper, we will illustrate that such behavior is indeed compatible with the 
implications of theoretical bargaining models that incorporate notions of fairness. 
3.  Wage bargaining between unions and firms 
Firms 
We consider an economy of n firms which sell their output in competitive goods markets.  
Output prices are normalized to unity. The profit function of a representative firm can be 
written as 
  L wL
α π= −,  (1) 
where w denotes the wage, L is employment, and  ( ) 0,1 α∈ . The corresponding labor demand 
function is given by 




α−  =  α 
.  (2) 
Unions and Workers 
For simplicity, we assume that all workers are unionized and that all n sectors of the 
economy can be described by a representative union-firm pair.  A representative union’s 
objective function is given by the standard utility function of a utilitarian union that weighs all 
its members equally: 
  ( ) ( ) 0 with , V w wL N L w L N =+− ≤  (3) Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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where N is the total number of union members and w0 denotes the alternative income. The 
alternative income is the income workers in each respective sector expect to receive should 
they lose their job. In this case, they would either find a job somewhere else in the economy 
or stay unemployed. For expositional convenience, we assume that each sector is sufficiently 
small so that its impact on aggregate measures is negligible and the alternative income is 
exogenous from each union’s point of view. We can then express the probability of finding, or 
not finding,  a job in the rest of the economy by the employment rate  (1 u − ) and 
unemployment rate (u), respectively. Moreover, the expected remuneration if finding a job in 
another sector is given by the  average wage  in the economy,  w.  Combining these 
opportunities, the expected utility of a sector i-worker from the alternative income can be 
expressed by  
  ( ) 0 1, w ub u w = +−   (4) 
with b denoting the wage-equivalent of being unemployed.  
The Nash bargaining solution 
We first analyze the bargaining outcome of the generalized Nash solution which has been 
used to solve most bargaining situations in labor economics.  Nash  (1950)  proposes an 
axiomatic solution that satisfies four plausible conditions: Pareto efficiency, invariance to 
equivalent utility representations, symmetry, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The 
Nash bargaining solution is the unique solution that satisfies these axioms. It can be formally 
written as: 
  ( )( )
12
112 2 , max
vv S vdvd
∈ Ω= − −,  (5) 
where vi is player i’s utility, di is i’s respective disagreement point, S is the utility possibility 
set, and Ω is the value of the Nash product. 
Applying this solution to our bargaining problem requires the specification of the relevant 
parameters in (5). First, both parties’ utilities are given by union’s utility function (3) and 
firm’s profit (1). Second, the parties’ disagreement payoffs are determined by their outside 
options. We assume that the firm’s outside option is given by zero profits.
2
                                                 
2 This assumption is uncritical and commonly used in the literature. We could instead assume any other value as 
long as it is constant and not too large without changing our results qualitatively. 
 If the firm and the Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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union do not come to an agreement, union members will have to look for a new job or become 
unemployed. Their expected income in this case is w0, given by (4).  Therefore, union’s 
outside option is given by  
  00 V wN = .  (6) 
The general Nash bargaining solution can then be written as 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 max
w Vw V w Ω= − π .  (7) 











.  (8) 
Figure 1 illustrates this result in π-V-space. The utility possibility frontier (UPF), depicting 
all the combinations of the firm’s profit  ( ) w π and the union’s utility  ( ) Vwthat correspond to 
various wage levels, is hill-shaped. At very high wages, profits and employment levels are 
close to zero, such that the union’s utility is close to its outside option V0.
3
( ) 0 1
mon ww = α
 If wages fall, both 
the firm’s profits as well as the union’s utility increase. In this range, the union benefits from 
lower wages and higher employment because the wages earned by the additional employees 
strictly outweigh the wage reduction of those employees that would also have been employed 
at higher wages. At point A, the two effects exactly balance and the union utility function 
reaches a maximum. Hence, point A indicates the monopoly union outcome. Maximization of 
(3), taking the firm’s labor demand function (2)  into account, shows that the monopoly 
union’s wage is  . To the right of A, further wage reductions increase profits 
but reduce the utility of the union. We restrict our attention to the case where employment 
does not exceed the number of union members. Hence, the UPF ends to the right at a point 
where all union members are employed, i. e. L(w) = N.
4
                                                 
3 Since profits are strictly positive for any finite wage level, the UPF does not intersect the ordinate. 
 
4 Restricting our attention to L(w)≤N can be justified by assuming that V0 exceeds the union’s utility at L=N, in 
which case the union would never set, or agree to, a wage low enough to increase employment beyond N. This 
assumption does not reduce the generality of the model, as it could be extended to cover also the case where 
L(w)>N. The UPF would extend to the right, but would be kinked at L=N (Oswald 1985). Our qualitative 
findings would remain unchanged.  Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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The Nash bargaining solution can also be represented graphically (Figure 1). The different 
values of the Nash product Ω can be illustrated by a set of iso-Nash-curves, each representing 
all combinations of π and V that yield the same value of Ω. The maximization problem in (7)
then implies that the Nash bargaining solution will be found at the point where the highest 
iso-Nash-curve is tangent to the utility possibility frontier (point B). The bargaining solution 
will necessarily be somewhere between the monopoly union solution (point A) and the point 
where the union would only be able to obtain its disagreement payoff (point C). 









Lw N ( )=
V( ( )) π
−1 π
 
The Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution 
The plausibility of some of the axioms necessary to derive the Nash bargaining solution 
has been questioned. In particular, the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives has 
received strong criticism (Luce and Raiffa 1957). This axiom requires that, if X is the Nash 
bargaining solution for a bargaining set S1, then for any subset S2 of S1 containing X, X 
continues to be the Nash bargaining solution. 
Kalai  and  Smorodinsky  (1975)  replace this axiom with the property of individual 
monotonicity. This axiom implies that the players must not suffer from an enlargement of the 
bargaining set that leaves the maximum utilities attainable by both players unchanged. Kalai 
and Smorodinsky (1975) prove that there is only one bargaining rule satisfying this new set of 
axioms. The KS solution consists of equalizing the parties' relative sacrifice of their maximum Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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payoff in excess of their conflict utilities. Although earlier works on wage bargaining (e.g. 
McDonald and Solow 1981) considered both the Nash and the KS solutions, subsequent work 
on wage bargaining has largely ignored the latter one. This negligence is surprising. First, 
although both solutions were originally derived axiomatically, they also have sound game-
theoretic foundations (see Binmore et al. (1986) for the Nash solution and Moulin (1984) for 
the KS solution). Second, economic as well as psychological experiments provide evidence 
for the view that people compare relative payoffs and bargain by mutually making relative 
concessions (Nydegger and Owen 1974, Roth and Malouf 1979). The Nash approach cannot 
capture this stylized  fact because of the independence of irrelevant alternatives  axiom. 
Replacing this axiom by the monotonicity axiom, as it has been done by  Kalai  and 
Smorodinsky (1975), allows individuals to compare relative payoffs and is thus more in line 
with the experimental evidence. 
Taking these facts into account, we  analyze  the  labor  market outcome under the 
assumption that the bargaining process follows the KS solution. This solution implies that 
both parties make equal proportional concessions from their respective favored points. 
Formally, the KS solution is given by  










= +λ λ λ∈ +λ − ∈   −  
 ,  (9) 
where v
* denotes the so-called “utopia point”. The utopia point is the vector of the largest 
utility  each player could hope to obtain, given that the other player receives at least his 
disagreement payoff. The utopia payoff 
*
i v  is then given by 
  ( ) { }
* sup : , and , i i ij i ij j v v vv S v dv d = ∈ ≥≥ .  (10) 
Since the utopia point will typically be outside the bargaining set S, the KS bargaining 
solution (9) gives both parties the largest feasible share λ of their respective maximum rent 
*
ii vd − , in excess of their disagreement payoffs. The solution can then also be described by 










.  (11) 
In order to describe the labor market outcome, we apply the formal concept of the KS 
solution to our bargaining model. Therefore, we specify the KS curve as follows. The utility Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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from reaching a bargain for both parties is again described by union's utility (3) and firm's 
profit function (1). As in the Nash solution discussed above, the respective utilities in the case 
of disagreement are given by  10 0 d V wN = =  and  20 0 d = π= . 
In a next step, we calculate both parties' utopia payoffs. For the union, its maximum 
feasible gain is determined by the highest wage the firm would be willing to pay without 
closing down. This wage can be derived by maximizing the union’s utility function subject to 
the condition that firm's profit is at least zero:  
  ( ) ( )
*
0 max s.t. 0
w V V w wL N L w L wL
α = = + − π= − ≥ .  (12) 
It is easy to see that the the union reaches its highest feasible utility if the wage equals the 
monopoly union wage,  0
mon ww = α . The utopia point of the firm π
* results from maximizing 




w L wL V V
α π = π= − ≥ .  (13) 
The firm achieves its highest profit by pushing the union down to the utility associated with 
its outside option. Hence, the solution to (13) is given by w0. 
Substituting the values for the firm’s and union’s objective functions, their utopia payoffs 
and their disagreement utilities into (11), we obtain an implicit determination of the bargained 
wage: 





Lw w w Lw w Lw





−  − 
.  (14) 
Taking the firm’s employment decision (2) and the monopoly union wage  into account, we 










.  (15) 
Figure 2 illustrates this general result. The utopia point is given by the vector ( )
** ,V π . π
∗ 
is the profit level at which the decreasing part of the UPF corresponds to the union’s outside 
option V0. Likewise, V
* is the largest union utility level at which the firm makes at least zero 
profits. This corresponds to point A, which illustrates that a party’s utopia payoff does not 
necessarily entail reducing the other party’s utility to its disagreement point. The KS curve Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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connects the disagreement point ( ) 0 0,V   with the utopia point. According to (9),  the KS 
solution is given by the highest point on the KS curve that is still part of the bargaining set. 
Hence, the KS bargaining solution is given by point D, where the KS curve intersects the 
utility possibility frontier. 















4.  Labor market effects of minimum wages 
We now turn to the analysis of the labor market effects of minimum wages. We analyze 
how  the introduction of minimum wages affects  the  bargained  wage  and  the resulting 
employment  level  in  both  the Nash and the KS bargaining solution.  We will distinguish 
between the introduction of (a) a minimum wage at the level of a single sector that does not 
apply to other sectors of the economy and  (b) a national minimum wage that applies 
uniformly to all sectors in the economy. Our main focus will be on the effects of non-binding 
minimum wages, i.e. minimum wages that are below the level already agreed upon between a 
union-firm-pair (if introduced at the sectoral level) or between all union-firm-pairs (if the 
minimum wage covers the whole economy). 
Nash bargaining  
We first analyze the case of a sectoral minimum wage that applies to a single sector only. 
If such a sectoral minimum wage w
min is introduced, we have to distinguish between the case Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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in which it is ex ante binding and the case where it is not. The minimum wage is ex ante not 
binding if it does not exceed the previously bargained wage in this sector, i. e. 
min Nash ww ≤ . 
Since the minimum wage is set only in this sector and does not apply to other sectors, it is 
irrelevant for both parties’ outside options. The bargaining set, however, becomes smaller 
since the minimum wage excludes a range of low wages (a segment to the very right of the 
utility possibility frontier in Figure  1).  However, the bargaining outcome without the 
minimum wage remains part of the bargaining set since the minimum wage is not binding. 
Due to the axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives, the reduction of the bargaining 
set must not have an impact on the bargaining outcome. Hence, a non-binding minimum wage 
at the sectoral level does not affect wages or employment.  This illustrates that the Nash 
solution does not exhibit menu dependence. 
If 
min Nash ww >   in the respective  sector,  the minimum wage is ex ante binding.  The 
minimum wage cuts off a segment of the UPF, including the initial bargaining outcome. The 
minimum wage then becomes a binding constraint on the bargaining outcome, thus lifting the 
bargained wage to the new minimum wage level. An ex ante binding minimum wage will 
then also be ex post binding. Summarizing these two cases, the new bargained wage 
Nash w   










 ≤  = 
>  
 .  (16) 
Let us now consider the case of a national minimum. If the minimum wage is non-binding 
in all sectors of the economy, the bargained wages will not change in any sector. Since there 
are no wage changes, there is also no change in any union’s outside option and, therefore, no 
labor market effects in the economy.  
If the national minimum wage is binding in at least one sector, however, the Nash wage in 
this sector rises to the minimum wage level. This wage rise in turn affects the outside option 
of all other unions in the economy. The change in the outside option resulting from the 
introduction of a minimum wage can be calculated by differentiating (4) with respect to the 
wage in sector i, wi, and taking into account the endogeneity of the unemployment rate and 
the average wage in equilibrium: 









   (16) Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
- 15 - 
 
The ambiguous sign follows from the endogeneity of both the unemployment rate and the 
average wage at the macroeconomic level. On the one hand, a higher wage in another sector 
increases the outside option as the average wage rises. On the other hand, the wage rise causes 
less employment in that sector, resulting in higher unemployment, a smaller chance to find a 
job, and thus in a lower outside option.  Although the aggregate outside option effect is 
ambiguous, the sign of the change in the bargained wage in any sector  ji ≠  in which the 
minimum wage is not binding is the same as the sign of the change in the outside option due 
to a binding minimum wage in sector i. This effect can be shown by differentiating the Nash 









=     
.  (17) 
Summing up, the minimum wage can only have an effect on wages and employment if it is 
binding in at least one sector. A minimum wage that is not binding anywhere will be 
ineffective. 
Proposition 1: If bargaining follows the Nash solution, a sectoral minimum wage that is ex 
ante not binding is ineffective. A national minimum wage can only have an effect on wages 
and employment if it is ex ante binding in at least one sector. 
Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining  
As discussed above, the KS solution implies that both bargaining parties agree on a wage 
that equalizes their relative utility gains. These relative utility gains are given by the ratio of 
the actual gain to the maximum feasible gain, where the maximum is defined by the payoff 
each party can secure by pushing the other party to the minimum it would just be willing (or 
allowed) to accept. If a sectoral minimum wage is introduced below the level of a union’s 
alternative income w0, this legal minimum would have no effect on the disagreement and 
utopia points. Since the cut-off segment of the UPF is to the right of the firm’s utopia payoff, 
the minimum wage would also leave the relevant segment of the UPF unchanged. Hence, 
non-binding minimum wages are ineffective also in the case of Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining 
if they do not exceed the union’s alternative wage. 
If the sectoral minimum wage is set at a non-binding level but above the alternative wage, 
this would reduce the firm’s utopia payoff because the best the firm can expect to achieve Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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now would be to push the wage down to its legal minimum. The firm’s utopia point, initially 
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The corresponding KS curve is given by 
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.  (19) 
Comparison with (14) shows that the non-binding minimum wage replaces the alternative 
income in the denominator of the firm’s relative gain (right-hand side of (20)). The bargained 
wage resulting from the introduction of a non-binding sectoral minimum wage can then be 
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If the minimum wage exceeds the alternative wage,  0
min ww > , the bargained wage depends 
not only on w0 but also on w
min. This gives our first result for the effect of minimum wages in 
the KS solution. 
Proposition 2: If bargaining follows the KS solution, a sectoral minimum wage between the 
union’s alternative wage and the originally bargained wage raises the bargained wage to a 
level above the initially bargained wage. 
This result, 
KS KS ww >    if  0
KS min www >> ,  follows directly from the assumption 






> , this new wage exceeds the former bargained wage, i. e. 
KS KS ww >  . Therefore, the minimum wage is not binding but nevertheless effective for wages 
and employment.  This shows that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is menu dependent. A 
change in the choices available to a firm-union-pair that does not affect their ability to choose 
their original agreement causes a shift in the bargaining outcome. Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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Let us now turn to the case in which the minimum wage is ex ante binding, i.e. it is set 
above the wage that workers would receive if there was no minimum wage. We summarize 
our second result in 
Proposition 3: If bargaining follows the KS solution, a sectoral minimum wage between the 
originally bargained wage and the monopoly union wage raises the bargained wage to a level 
above the minimum wage. If the sectoral minimum wage is set above the monopoly union 
wage, the bargained wage equals the minimum wage. 
The first part of this result follows for the case 
mon min KS www >> . As we want to prove 
that 
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.  (22) 
If the minimum wage is lower than the monopoly union wage, i.e.  0
min ww <α , then the left-
hand side in (23) is always greater than 1, while the right-hand side is smaller than 1. Hence, 
inequality  (22)  holds, which yields 
KS min KS www >>  . This result implies that a sectoral 
minimum wage that is ex ante binding can nevertheless be ex post non-binding. 
If 
min mon ww > , the corresponding KS curve becomes 
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,  (23) 
which immediately implies that the bargained wage corresponds to w
min. In this case, the 
minimum wage will be binding ex ante as well as ex post. 
Figure  3  illustrates these results. The introduction of a minimum wage above the 
alternative wage cuts off a segment of the UPF (dotted) and shifts the firm’s utopia payoff to 
the left. Even at its best conceivable outcome, its profit will be lower than without the 
minimum wage. The disagreement point stays unchanged because a sectoral minimum wage 
does not affect the payoffs the firm and the union could obtain outside their own sector. This Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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causes a  counter-clockwise rotation of the KS curve, which leads to an increase in the 
bargained wage. The bargaining outcome shifts from D to E. The logic of Figure 3 also 
suggests that any minimum wage below the monopoly union wage w
mon (point A) will lead to 
a bargained wage above the new minimum. If 
min mon ww > , the utopia point will coincide with 
the UPF because both parties’ most preferred, and legal, wage is the minimum wage. Only in 
this case can a sectoral minimum wage be ex post binding in the sense that the new bargained 
wage is equal to the minimum wage. 













Finally, we want to briefly comment on the labor market effects of a national minimum 
wage. If  0
min w wi ≤∀ , i. e. the national minimum is below the respective outside option in 
each sector, then the minimum wage will be ineffective in any sector and thus also at the 
national level. If  0 :
min iw w ∃> , however, the minimum wage changes the utopia point in this 
sector i. Consequently, the wage in this sector rises. Although the sign of this change on the 
outside option in some other sector j is ambiguous, the effect on the KS wage can be shown 
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.  (24) 
This implies the following result: Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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Proposition 4: If bargaining follows the KS solution, a national minimum wage affects wages 
and employment if it exceeds the union’s outside option in at least one sector. 
While Proposition 2 shows that a minimum wage does not have to be binding to have an 
effect on the sector in which it is  introduced,  Proposition 4  demonstrates that wage and 
employment effects can arise in some sector even if the minimum wage is less than the 
union’s outside option as long as it exceeds that alternative wage in some other sector. 
5.  Conclusion 
The labor market effects of statutory minimum wages are a hotly debated topic in 
economics and politics. Despite the often controversial  debate between proponents and 
opponents of minimum wages, there is one issue that receives general support from both sides 
alike: minimum wages set at a non-binding level cannot be effective in raising wages. Unless 
the minimum wage is set above the wage level of at least some workers, it will not have any 
effect on wages and employment. 
We briefly discussed a number of empirical observations that cast doubt on the universal 
validity of this conventional view. Empirical evidence shows that minimum wages do not 
only affect wages previously below the new minimum, but that they also have spillover 
effects on other wages higher up in the wage distribution (Card and Krueger 1995, Neumark 
and Wascher 2008). Experimental findings by Falk et al. (2006) suggest that the introduction 
of a minimum wage affects the wage level that people are willing to accept even if the 
minimum wage is too low to affect them directly. A potential explanation for this observed 
behavior is that minimum wages act as a focal point used by people  to determine what 
remuneration they consider to be a ”fair” compensation for their work. If increasing the 
minimum wage raises the wage that workers demand in the labor market, even a non-binding 
minimum wage has labor market effects. Therefore, fairness concerns help to understand why 
firms react to a higher minimum wage by raising wages more than necessary to comply with 
the new minimum. Two important stylized facts emerge from the empirical and experimental 
evidence on minimum wages. First, firms raise the wages of workers that used to earn less 
than the new minimum wage above the minimum level required. Second, workers already 
earning wages above the new minimum wage receive additional wage raises as well.  
In this paper, we have analyzed how these observations can be explained by theoretical 
wage bargaining models. The most common bargaining model in labor economics is the Nash Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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bargaining model. We showed that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage cannot 
change the outcome of a Nash  bargain because it does not affect any of the relevant 
parameters of the bargaining solution. In particular, non-binding minimum wages eliminate a 
segment of the bargaining set in which no bargaining agreement was found to begin with. Due 
to the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, a non-binding minimum wage is 
irrelevant for the bargaining outcome. 
Contrary to the Nash solution,  the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution is able to 
explain the empirically observed effects of non-binding minimum wages. This bargaining 
solution allows for menu dependence because each side’s bargaining outcome does not only 
depend on its outside option, but also on how much it could have at best obtained from the 
bargain. The smaller is a party’s maximum attainable gain, the smaller will also be its share in 
the bargaining outcome. In the case of wage bargaining, a minimum wage reduces the 
maximum attainable gain for the firm. Prior to the introduction of the minimum wage, the best 
a firm could achieve was to reduce the union’s payoff to its outside option. With a wage floor 
above the former outside option, the firm now can at best reduce the wage to its statutory 
minimum. This reduces its claim to the bargaining set and leads to higher wages.  
On a more general level, our findings indicate that the choice of the specific bargaining 
solution used in theoretical models of the labor market is not innocuous. Uncritically applying 
the Nash solution can obstruct the view on important mechanisms through which labor market 
policies can affect wages and employment. As we demonstrated in this paper, minimum 
wages are one application where the choice of the bargaining solution strongly affects the 
implications derived from theoretical models. There are certainly many other policies for 
which this is the case, too.
5
                                                 
5 For example, Gerber and Upmann (2006) show that changes in the reservation wage can have qualitatively 
different effects in Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky wage bargaining models when the parties negotiate over wages 
and employment. 
 Identifying those policies, and deriving a more differentiated 
picture of their labor market effects for various bargaining solutions, provides ample room for 
further research.  Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages 
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